

Deschamps NAO

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Equal vulnerability of missiles is not desirable,
stabilizing of societies, & cities, yes.

McA looked (thought) SU would stop with
(adequate) min det, or det only:

SU D-L was absolutely infeasible.

If didn't — the built up of CF D-L
were feasible and desirable —

& threaten FS, like us?

No — though it could deter

US EO! desirable for SU! or, US rec.!

Mainly (if competitive) the first limited
US posture and aim — which was not
NAO or "Mutually Assured Destruction"
destruction

and not, even, planned on assumption of
NAO (destruction: as D-L) on either side.

McA did not limit US forces to Destruction (of
cities) or Det-only Min or Max.

He just didn't pressure D-L CF to its
limits — as US&E would.

*

He could (should) have adopted Det-only, ^{reduced forces}

NAO was the effort, the reality — but not the
doctrine, plans, together — on either side.

"Don't worry - SU(R) will never believe
they might be about to be attacked."

1981-1983

Why increasing? Crises!

SS-20/P-II
MIRV

SU ICBMs - threat to US ICBMs - revised
US fears - R, and for Star Wars, and now

"We are behind!" (Shirley B. Ford) SPD

No thought of clearing trail: Not of MO ("AO/MAO") rather, MIRV
like threats of dead! ABM!

ICBM vulnerability was a reason to worry -
it couldn't be fixed (MX, Denver Post, ABM, SDI)
so get rid of them! urgent since
new SU missiles 1979-81-82 SS-17, 18, 19...!

SDI - "get rid of new shot"!
rather: FS!

We maintained SCBMs - stable shot

(if not so many as to force
"use or lose" on SU (CBMs!))

R remains
63-64

How would US programs have looked
to a SU Team B? under Ford SU Pipes?
cheap, P-II, MX, CM, ^{security threat} or often: Carter, Reagan
(though: no CO;

in 1970's-1980's - neither wanted to launch
a FS quite the other
~~so to that it~~

($\approx$ VPK + F in C-IT : now EU)

But each prepared & looked as if they did

spends US wanted to be able to threaten FS
64 - FS that threatened Eight Int.

Did the SU? Yes if so, why?

if not, why did they?

(imitate US - in a way they defended)

or, CBOs? in accuracy?

(Exaggerated of Gen B-
to back effort for SU-)

D.H. p. 19

D.H. p. 19

Did US really fear a "unprovoked"
attack of SU?

(If did foresee - EU vs. NVN:
~ 1962-75...)

Center-By - P-IT Response to SS-20

(this deceit)

(Why that?)

After...

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Soviets could have given up SS-20, to stop P-IT and GCMs!

Streptococcus, pneumoniae (1983)
or else (C-4)

The greatest danger to human survival is
(SU) R fear of a US FS, machines to
prompt (or retaliate to) it, and possibility
that a false alarm will trigger
exp. in a crisis: or not (1983 - high rhetoric)

|| What do Berrians believe might follow
(fear)
on Israeli-US new attack on them?

What would either US or R do in event of
India-Pak new war?

Distinguishing Heng's WMD was not the
"CCD" of motives to attack Heng -

It was not among the real ones.

Any more than: wrecking AQ
(at least the appearance)

It was just the best external, pretense

more: distinguishing SO major attack

was not among the major for years
of SIOB-63 to 1962: of C-T...

(was it, for SIOB-62? not
for any or Heng: or the!)

To block program, one must know and
understand the real, private, secret ones
of it - can't just show that it will
not work, or is not needed for, public,
deliberate ones!

Peter de Fazio COG

and GWOP, Current Conf!

12-6-11 Missile gap (+ K bluffs!) and other very stimulate
shows will can have false fears

Army Navy should have leading to arms buildup
have (a) Confrontation, negotiation process position / false alarm
(NOT BARGAINING) on (b) Monitored responsiveness, reliability
2810P

+ CONGRESS 1993: Both sides " " " "

+ Experts

(OK - Jan B; Neither tried to resolve this by communication,
but transparent) challenge, joint inspection, reassurance
in Congress)

vs. uniting measure in intel, surveillance

Wg dealt DOD & Congress changes - and
internal controversy -

Lead to urgent efforts to rebuild
these "scientifically," objective investigation
[see UN!]

Proliferation investigation

(Expansion efforts

and outreach efforts

On Econ = theories, policies" - where they
differ, and cannot force policies are not
working

+?

Krugman / slightly vs. Henderson, Summers, Feld

yes, with the

"authorities" (based on memory) Expose reasoning and controversy
in Feld - more transparent

try to expose, deal with controversy in Supreme Court (appellate)

9-11 is for us as the Holocaust is for Africans. The
entitlement (based on victimization, by the
victim)
to do anything.

"The end justifies the means"

"well, of course, what 'justifies' any
means — if the end justifies"

Beginning is — — — — —

X constructed a D.M. If it worked
as planned, under some circumstances it would mean

What circumstances? When will Pius be achieved
to press button? according to approval
guidance — it will be approved to release,
to execution?